

# Mean-field dynamics of attractive resource interaction: From uniform to aggregated states

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Modeling systems composed of many components competing for a limited resource is central to sociophysics and mathematical biology [2, 7]. A key question is whether such systems converge to a uniform equilibrium (consensus) or an aggregated state (polarization/monopoly).

While repulsive interactions typically model strict competition [3], we focus on *attractive interaction*, which describes cooperation, alliance formation, or capital concentration. This connects to the concept of “conflict” between probability measures [4] and mean-field games [5].

We consider a system on a simplex defined by a probability measure  $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, \dots, p_n)$ ,  $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1$ . The evolution is governed by the map

$$p_i^{t+1} = \frac{p_i^t(1 + c_i r_i^t)}{z^t}, \quad r_i^t = \frac{1 - p_i^t}{n - 1}, \quad (1)$$

where  $z^t$  is the normalization factor. The parameters  $c_i \in (0, 1]$  represent the “attractiveness” of the  $i$ -th component.

**Uniform states and consensus.** Consider the case where favorable conditions are identical:  $c_i = c$  for all  $i$ . The dynamics simplify to a nonlinear consensus protocol.

**Theorem 1.** *If  $c_i = c$  for all  $i$ , every trajectory with positive initial coordinates converges to the centroid of the simplex*

$$\mathbf{p}^\infty = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{p}^t = \left( \frac{1}{n}, \dots, \frac{1}{n} \right).$$

*Stability analysis.* The Jacobian matrix  $J$  at the centroid has a specific structure with eigenvalues  $\lambda = \frac{n^2 - 2}{n^2 - 1}$ . Since  $|\lambda| < 1$  for  $n > 1$ , the uniform state is locally asymptotically stable. Boundary states (where some  $p_i = 0$ ) are unstable repellers in this regime. This mirrors results in linear consensus models [6] but arises here from multiplicative interactions.

**Aggregated states and bifurcations.** Let  $M^* = \{k \mid p_k^\infty > 0\}$  be the set of indices for which the coordinates of the limiting vector are strictly positive. Then  $\gamma(M^*)$  is the number of elements in the set  $M^*$ . The existence and uniqueness of  $M^*$  are determined by the iterative procedure (1). Let us denote

$$\Lambda(M^*) = \frac{\gamma(M^*) - 1}{\sum_{k \in M^*} \frac{1}{c_k}}.$$

**Theorem 2.** *For any set of parameters, the system converges to a unique fixed point  $\mathbf{p}^\infty$ . For any  $i$ , the limit coordinate is*

$$p_i^\infty = \max \left( 0, 1 - \frac{\Lambda(M^*)}{c_i} \right). \quad (2)$$

This result implies that a component survives ( $p_i^\infty > 0$ ) if and only if its attractiveness  $c_i$  exceeds the systemic threshold  $\Lambda$ .

The transition where a component  $p_i^\infty$  vanishes corresponds to a *transcritical bifurcation*. At  $c_i = \Lambda$ , the stable interior fixed point collides with an unstable boundary fixed point, exchanging stability. This mechanism explains the “exclusion principle” in our model: weak agents are

pushed to the boundary ( $p_i = 0$ ) not by repulsion, but by insufficient attraction relative to the mean field. This relates to border-collision bifurcations in piecewise-smooth maps [1].

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